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Introduction
In the past few years there has been a rapid acceleration in the study
of the implementation of computer-based decision aids. Most of this research
is centered around two basic questions:
1. What are the key variables - organizational, individual, and technical
- relevant to the implementation process?
2. What are the common patterns in either successful or unsuccessful im-
plementation efforts?
The research is generally exploratory; much of it is data-gathering rather
than theory-building or theory-testing and involves surveying large samples
of projects in various organizations or industries through structured interviews
and questionnaires. The results are sifted to identify clusters of variables
- 'factors' - that are interrelated and that correlate with some measure of im-
plementation success, such as user satisfaction. This sifting is generally
atheoretical and aims, in fact, at inducting a base for theory.!
In assessing the value of such research on implementation, and in drawing
conclusions from it, it is essential to stress how recent the topic is, even
though it is also increasing in visibility and frequency of reference (to the
extent that 'Implementation' seems to be taking over from 'Design' in the
titles of journal articles). There is a Standard Paragraph that begins many
discussions of implementation - including, of course, this one. It starts by
pointing out that implementation ^ a very recent topic: Batchelor's biblio-
graphy of the OR/MS literature in 1965 did not even include the term in its
index. 2 Radnor and Mylan's 1968 literature search found only 15 out of 750
articles focused on implementation. 3 Even more gloomily. Urban reports that
only 3 percent of the 150 articles published in Management Science; App-
lication between January 1971 and June 1973 represented implementation.
The Standard Paragraph then moves on to point out that there is an im-
plementation crisis, and that many more systems are built than are used. The
1960 's version of the S.P. would cite Churchman's finding (196A) that in six
years' issues of Operations Research Quarterly there was virtually no evidence
that any of the models discussed were ever used.-* The 1975 version could re-
inforce this from a variety of sources. Drake (1973), in surveying computer
models for transportation planning, was able to identify expenditures of over
a million dollars a year"; while some of the models were never completed and
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sank after 'disagreement and disaster', the ones that were 'successfully'
built seemed rarely, if at all, used by the decision makers for whom they
were commissioned. The Standard Paragraph then closes by bemoaning our
lack of empirical data and/or theory and promises to solve the world or
tentatively explore it, depending on how good the researcher's own data has
turned out to be.
The Standard Paragraph highlights our very defensive position on im-
plementation. There is a crisis and we have little wisdom to offer. In
parallel to this - perhaps even in reaction to it - there seems to be an
increasing anti-academic bias among managers and practicioners who care
about the Implementation Gap, with, in particular, an attack on schools of
management for not providing the right training in the troops they send out
onto the battlefield. An insightful illustration of this attack can be found
in a panel discussion from the 1971 national TIMS meeting which later appear-
ed under the title "Through a Glass Darkly" in Interfaces (August 1911) J It
contains brief presentations by six practicioners, all of whom are well-known
and active participants in MS and MIS societies and who, therefore, have been
true believers in and missionaries for the Analytic Method. Their arguments
are uniform in tone; the following extracts are representative of their dis-
cussion :
Table 1 Through a Glass Darkly
H. Halbrecht (Chairman Halbrecht Associates, management recruiting company
with substantial experience in recruiting senior OR and MIS
personnel)
"...the obvious fact that many people have not been willing to face
(is) that the management science profession is in trouble. It is in
substantial trouble and in many cases well-deserved trouble."
E.S. Savas (First Deputy City Administrator, Mayor's Office, New York City)
"How to Make OR Fail Without Really Trying"
"... We have been reluctant to hire people with Ph.D. 's in OR on the
grounds that they have acquired 'a trained incapacity to think' (Herman
Kahn) , a rigidity brought on by some forms of higher education..."
G. Hoffman (Manager of Operations Research, Standard Oil of Indiana)
"The Missing 90% of Management Science"
"... The graduates of OR curricula are not adequately trained in OR. I
now make a more damning assertion; usually these graduates are not edu-
cated at all."

H. Ay res (Vice-President for Operations Research, Morgan Guaranty)
"Skills for Effective Management Science"
"...We've really made very few job offers (to OR graduates). What
stands out in my mind is that I don't think many of them realize
what OR/MS really is. Who is to blame for this? Let's try blaming
the academicians who train them these people. They do not train them in
OR/MS; they train them in applied mathemtics and that's all."
Many of the panel's strictures may be less true now than in 1971; cer-
tainly most management schools are sensitive to the issues they raise and
there has been a tremendous growth in applied research and training. None
the less, the points have much force; they highlight the well-entrenched
bias that has led to many, if not most OR/MS /MIS specialists defining their
role in terms of technical and design skills, rather than as implementers.
The panel's attack focuses on the lack among analytic specialists of:
1. an understanding of how decisions are really made
2. insight into and identification with managers
3. an ability to relate technique to context
A. a view of their role as supporting the management process
An obvious recent continuation of this theme is C. Jackson Grayson's crit-
icism of the value of management science methods based on his experiences as
chairman of the Federal Price Commission (Harvard Business Review, July 1973)
"Management Science and Business Practice". Grayson, like the panel in
"Through a Glass Darkly", is no ignorant outsider, but a veteran in teaching
and supporting analytic skills. His article suggests the disillusion of a
lost faith:
"Managers and management scientists are operating as two separate
cultures, each with its own goals, languages and methods. Effective
cooperation - and even communication - between the two is just about
minimal. S"
Grayson's solution to the implementation problem is one that many other
writers have suggested: training the manager and the management scientist
towards a common middle ground, so that both have mutual understanding and
shared skills. That solution may be very difficult to effect in that mana-
gers and specialists are generally unwilling, unable or too overburdened to
spend time acquiring new skills that are of marginal value in their present
jobs. More importantly, the main value of the specialist is his specializa-
tion. The methodological, rigorous analytic approach to problem-solving
that is the idiosyncratic gift of the management scientist is fairly unusual;
it is applicable in particular contexts only and represents an expertise that

is valuable mainly because of its specialized availability and applicability.
In passing, it is worth noting that several researchers who have examined the
'cognitive styles' of managers and management scientists strongly imply that
the scientist's skills presuppose a particular mode of thinking that is ex-
tremely hard to develop among many managers, whose equally distinctive abili-
ties are built on an entirely different set of problem-solving strategies and
habits.
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All the quotations cited above reinforce our defensive posture about both
research on and practice in implementation. They clearly suggest that manage-
ment scientists must develop a more effective role; of course, many counter-
attacks reach a parallel conclusion that managers must develop new knowledge
and be much more willing to take an active part in the implementation process.
While this defensiveness and rather negative position is widespread, it repre-
sents a pessimism that is expressed rather than believed. When we stop to
think about the general achievements of OR/MS/MIS there is ample reason for
disillusion and yet, as a profession, management scientists and educators in
analytic subject areas obviously feel that they are having a beneficial impact
on organizational decision-making and that, on the whole. Progress is being
made (though they will admit that perhaps, in the past, there was a tiny bit
too much overselling). To a large extent, the emerging focus on implementation
and the context of techniques, rather than on technique in itself, implies a
welcome maturation within the management science field. Five years or so ago,
the central issue was the development of relevant techniques; now those tech-
niques are generally well-understood and there is a sufficient body of experience
with them - negative as well as positive - to highlight issues beyond the
design of models and systems. The strictures made by the panel of Through a
Glass Darkly are justified but they provide a base for optimistic conclusions.
They demand a refocusslng of the role of the management scientist and in their
very criticisms provide pointers as to what that role should be. The aim in
the rest of this paper is to define that role, based both on conclusions that
can be synthesized from the fragmented exploratory research of the past few
years and on the equally fragmented beliefs and behaviors of effective imple-
menters in organizations. The main intention in the illustrations made so far
is to suggest that the central - and in many ways simple - aspect of that role
is a clinical, diagnostic approach to implementation, the ability to assess
the full organizational and management 'reality' and to adapt formal design

and technique to it. OR graduates, trained in a tradition that is explicitly
rationalisitic, technical and normative, too often lack that ability, or
perhaps simply lack an awareness of its relevance so that the ability remains
dormant rather than absent. In some ways, redefining one's role from being
a designer to becoming an implementer of models and systems will, in itself,
make those latent abilities manifest, 10
actor' Research on Implementation
Having recommended this shift in perspective, we have, alas, very little
conventional wisdom to pass on to the would-be implementer. At the start of
this paper a deceptively simple question was posed:
"What are the factors that enhance the likelihood of successful
implementation?
"
A recent paper by Ginzberg-'--'- that surveys the efforts to answer this question
finds astonishingly fragmented and even contradictory answers. The paper
dissects 14 'Factor' studies, all of which are extensive, well-researched
and Insightful, so that Ginzberg is in no way jousting with straw men. 12 it
identifies 140 distinct factors that are reported as having a significant in-
fluence on the likelihood of success in implementation: Of these only 15 (11%)
appear in 3 or more of the 14 studies and 102 (73%) are reported in only one
study. Table 2 shows the breakdown of the 140 factors:
Table 2 Breakdown of Factors Reported in 14 Studies (Ginzberg)
140 Total Factors
102 (73%) reported in 1 study only
23 (16%) reported in 2 studies
12 (09%) reported in 3 studies
2 " " 4 studies
1 I.
II 5 studies
Factors reported in 4 studies:
a) "well-defined, measureable objectives"
b) "complexity of techniques and models"
Factor reported in 5 studies:
c) "top management support"
Only three factors appear to have any broad empirical support. In some
cases factors found to correlate with particular patterns of success or failure

in implementation are hard to interpret. For example, Hervey •'-^ finds
"well-defined, measureable objectives" to be of substantial impact while
Dickson and Powers-'-^ report it as having no dlscemable influence using
any of the four measures of "success" they employed. Smith et al-'-^ find a
moderate effect and Carter et al-'-", in a very ambitious study, find a very
large impact. This lack of consensus is not at all unusual in an immature
field of research (or in mature ones, as the recent history of economics
indicates) but, of course, it hinders the development of prescriptive tech-
niques. At best, our conventional wisdom about the factors affecting imple-
mentation success are those shown in Table 3 and even this is tentative.
Tab le 3 The Conventional Wisdom on Implementation
'top management support"
'a clear felt need by the client"
'an immediate, visible problem to work on"
'early commitment by the user and conscious staff involvement"
'a well-institutionalized OR/MS group."
Some of these may also be hygiene factors in Herzberg's sense of the term-'-'^;
without top management support, for instance, a project faces major difficul-
ties, but having that support may be of little direct help.
The factor research is less than the sum of its parts. While it has
isolated at least some of the clusters of variables relevant to implement-
ation, it has not shown their interrelations, has not provided the maps
necessary for understanding the dynamics of the process. Too often, its find-
ings are merely correlative. For example, the Northwestern School, under
various permutations of Neal, Radnor, Rubinstein and colleagues^S, have pro-
vided in-depth longitudinal studies of the organizational correlates of success-
ful OR/MS implementation; these have used large, heterogeneous samples over
a long time period and are clearly among the most scrupulous, insightful and
reliable empirical analyses so far available. This research has provided some
especially valuable conclusions about the life cycle of OR/MS groups and
their activities.^" Even here, though, the studies generally allow only de-
scriptive post hoc reconstructions with little development of prescriptive
techniques in that they often focus on what are, at best, semi-controllable
variables, such as the value to the OR/MS group of a formal charter. More

importantly, they identify associations without throwing much light on the
causal dynamics of the underlying process. Bean, Neal, Radnor and Tansik
(1973) surveyed 108 companies In 12 Industry sectors, with 10 to 15 projects
in each company. '^^ They examine 30 factors, using two measures of "success":
1. the percentage of initiated projects that are actually completed
2. a subjective assessment by the head of the OR/MS activity of his
group's overall success.
Of the thirty factors examined, about one-third have no apparent re-
lation to either of the two measures of success. Table 4 summarizes the re-
sults :
Table 4 Bean et al Summary of Significant Factors
Factors correlating with success measures
1 2 3
implementation group head's both rate and
rate overall assessment overall assessment
Positive
Correlation 10 10 7
Negative
Correlation 4 2
The factors positively correlated with both measures of success are:
1. management support for the MS approach and the technical group
2. top management interest and involvement in projects
3. the proportion of the MS group leader's time spent on implementation
4. the level of the MS group leader within the organizational hierarchy
5. the formality of the MS group (including an organizational charter)
6. the size of the MS group in relation to the size of the organization
7. the availability of data and information relevant to the problem situation
One factor, "post-project evaluation audit" is positively correlated with
the rate of project implementation, but not with overall perceived success.
It is difficult to assign a meaning to this unless one examines the dynamics
of the process it reflects; presvnnably the post-project audit relates back to
other procedures in planning and/or project management that are the causal

Influence. The problem this example illustrates is a common one in Factor
rpHearcli, a haHtcally atatic analysis of a dynamic multidimensional process,
a HiiapHliol of altltudlnal or stnu;tural variables at a particular point in
time. The nature of the process is Inducted by clustering and correlating
those variables. ^1
The conclusion to be drawn from the Factor research as a whole is not
so much that we have no basis for a conventional wisdom as that there are
obviously few absolutes. The contradictions and lack of overlap Ginzberg
found in the fourteen studies he assessed suggest that implementation is a
contingent process. The panel of Through a Glass Darkly seem to feel this,
too, in that they criticize management scientists for not adjusting to the
particular demands of the manager's situation. The term 'contingency theory'
is a major trend, even a fad, in behavioral areas of organizational research. 22
It neatly cuts through some Gordian knots by, for instance, conveniently
accepting such contradictions as those in Ginzberg 's survey as due to some
'background features' of the situation (this Is Nadel's phrase in a discussion
of some similar problems to the ones discussed here, in comparative research
in political science23) . Implementation is then viewed as a function of many
I
forces, the strength of which varies according to context - that is, "it all
depends". However, this contingency approach can raise more issues than it
resolves, since of course the key problem is to identify just what it all
depends on and how. This requires metatheory, a theory of contingency. Of
course, it also implies that regardless of our ability to provide this meta-
theory, the implementer can be effective only if he can map the contingencies
of the situation, that indeed there are no absolutes to guide him and that
his techniques must be tailored to his clinical assessment of their context.
A Conceptual Map of the Implementation Process
A clinician needs a checklist of symptoms. The next section of this
paper presents a simple conceptualization of the implementation process;
this is not intended as a 'theory' of implementation but as an elementary
and general map that can allow the implementer to diagnose and take action.
The context of implementation is a complex fusion of contingent variables
and a key step in managing the process is simply to identify the key Issues
and constraints and determine their relative influence.

Figure 1 represents the contingent variables in terms of a literal,
Lewinlan force field. 24 jj^g uni-directional solid
arrowH represent 'forces'; for example, the characteristics of the problem.
Its structurabillty , urgency etc., exert a force that influences the direction
of the implementation process. If one thinks of that outcome force as aiming
towards a neon-lit gateway labelled "Success" then each force in the field can
either divert the implementation process or help point towards success. (Or
as the dotted lines show, toward disaster).
[Figure 1]
IMPLEMENTATION AS A FORCE FIELD
CLIENT/USER characteristics
cognitive style
decision making style
adaptivity/resistance to change
education
^
attitude to OR/MS /MIS \
political/career aims \
ANALYST characteristics
skills: technical
behavioral
experience
attitude toward managers
\
^
/
PROBLEM characteristics
structurabillty
urgency
visibility
frequency (recurrent/one-shot)
ORGANIZATIONAL characteristics
communication
structure
control and reward systems
history of OR/MS/MIS experience
profitability
type(s) of personnel
TECHNOLOGY
complexity
coramunicability
reliability
/
mPLEMENTATION
PROCESS SUCCESS
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This schematization is obviously an oversimplification and, even on
its own terms, is incomplete. In some sense it merely, like the factor re-
search, clusters variables, adding in the notion of directional strength
and influence. The key feature to be stressed, though, is that many of the
potential forces are not acting in a particular context (while in others
they may be of dominating impact). For example, Figure 2 (below) character-
izes a hypothetical situation in which a chemicals company requires a one-shot
production planning model for scliedullng a new product. The problem is a
complex one, involving a variety of constraints; the required data is, however,
available and there seem to be a niamber of applicable standard optimization
techniques. The OR/MS group is well-institutionalized, though the manager
for whom the model is to be designed has had only intermittent contact with
the group. He is an engineer with a fairly strong mathematical background.
Finally, the problem has very few interdepartmental implications.
[Figure 2]
USER
analytic
comfortable with OR approach
\
ANAI,YST \
knowledgeable about problem area
comfortable with user approach
ORGANIZATION > c\ >. SUCCESS
decision is important but similar to
many preceding ones
decision is at operational level
well-defined criteria for effecting
the decision
PROBLEM
well-structured
high payoff from analytic approach
TECHNOLOGY
standard techniques available
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In LIiIh h 1 tu/il Ion , tlie rt-levaiit. vurlablt-H combine to facilitate ImpJfment-
atlon. There are only u few forces (and virtually no organizational forces)
each of which tends towards the right direction; for example, the manager's
training and experience are compatible with the analytic approach and there are
no pressures from organizational politics. The problem, too, is a textbook
case, optimization of a well-defined, well structured production process.
If, however, the fiction is only slightly changed and we assume that the
manager is hostile to OR/MS and a 'seat-of-the-pants-and-proud-of-it ' type,
then the outcome of the force field is very different and the implementation
effort is very likely to be a failure. The mode of problem-solving implicit
in an optimization model is alien to this manager; he is unconvinced of its
value and validity, lacks the ability to critique it and is very probably
personally threatened by it. If, but only if, the management scientist diag-
noses this force field he can almost certainly adjust the forces through his
own implementation strategy. He can, for example, spend substantial effort
building a conceptual line of credit with the manager, starting from a very
simple simulation model that the manager can explore to better define terms,
constraints and alternatives; the manager can more easily validate the out-
puts of such a model and thus build trust and confidence in the management
scientist as a basis for later accepting a more complex optimization model.
In terms of the force field representation, the implementer*8 strategy in-
volves strengthening or weakening existing forces or adding a new countering
force; this adjustment is represented by Figure 3 (b)
.
Figure 3
A) user characteristics
problem characteristics
Implementation
Strategy
B) user characteristics ^
li>'blpni I bar acterlft Ics ~t
_> success
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A Clinical Strategy
Obviously, the schematization shown in Figure 3 does not define the
exact nature of the tmplementer 's strategy. It does, however, make clear
the Immense risk involved in not identifying relevant forces. A clinical
diagnosis prior to any design of the model or system to be implemented will
at least give the implementer a stronger hand to play. Clearly, even with
such a diagnosis, there is always a chance that the user will still reject
the result, whatever the implementer does. None the less, the implementer
can at least develop a conscious strategy based on risk rather than on good
faith and blithe ignorance of the hidden undercurrents of a situation.
Implementation is too often the management of unanticipated consequences;
in the situation outlined in Figure 3 above, the management scientist, if
he designs his model without identifying and adjusting to the relevant con-
tingencies, will later have to become a firefighter. Firefighting is expen-
sive and generally ineffectual.
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This redefinition of the implementer 's role from designer to clinician
and facilitator is really very simple. It may not require much new knowledge,
merely a recognition and assimilation of relevant knowledge. For example,
a number of researchers, including the author, have focused on the issues
sketched out in the hypothetical situation in Figure 3, the impact of cogni-
tive style on the willingness to adopt analytic methods:
"...such aids (analytic models) must be designed to amplify the
user's problem-solving strategies. Thus it seems that the central
factor in determining whether a manager will use a model to reach
a decision is the extent to which it 'fits' his style of thinking
...If the manager and thp management scientist can recognize
first that each has a different cognitive stvle, and thus a
different way of solving the same problem, then their dialogue seems
more likely to bear fruit." (McKenney and Keen)^^
A difficulty with this claim, even if valid, is that cognitive style is
only one of many interacting variables. It seems better to modify the argument
and to speak of cognitive style as a potential constraint or facilitator in
implementation; it is not always relevant to a particular situation, but the
management scientist must diagnose when it is or la not relevant, tf he Is to
meinage the implementation process.
The technical and normative traditions of management science have often delib-
erately ignored this need. As Starr points out in "The Politics of Management
Science", the analytic view of Truth is '0,1' while the manager's 'truth'
always has a political context; he argues that the analyst must also be a
'political scientist' who includes managerial attitudes in his choice of a
solution, an argument parallel to the one made here. 26 Starr's example is
especially relevant in that some management ecientlHts conHcloualy chooHi* to
ignore political forces even though they are readily apparent. Gibson and
Hammond provide a fairly typical example of this. 2' They describe a large-
scale project in the corporate planning department of a large manufacturing
company. Progress over the first three months was excellent and the staff
viewed it as a very effective venture. It was, however, abruptly terminated.

14
The model built by the staff was technically well-designed and the logisitical
problems were handled well. The economic issues involved were understood by
both the design group and the planning staff. Moreover, the operational char-
acteristics of the model were clearly suited to the planners and analysts who
used its outputs in preparing their recommendations. Their report was skill-
fully presented and, indeed, very well-received by Mr. Cabot, the vice-president
who had commissioned the model. Despite all this, the implementation effort
had no impact on top management's decisions, except to raise their anger. Un-
fortunately, Mr. Cabot has aspitations for succeeding to the recently vacated
presidency of the company and was using the modelling project, as the design
team were almost gleefully aware , as a way to 'preempt other departments in
the planning process and later to shine in front of the Board' by presenting
the very impressive results of the modelling project. He was shot down and
the corporate planning department bore the brunt of his dismay and top manage-
ment's irritation.
The key symptom in this project, what Gibson and Hammond call the
'informal-social' contingencies, was known and ignored. The design group
presumably had not thought through the direct relevance of such outside, non-
technical forces for their own actions. The political dimension is
not always relevant to an implementation effort; here it was, and the design
team should have recognized it as being so. To explain the failure of the
project as being due to non-rational 'politics' is not to excuse it. The lack
of a clinical definition of their role led them into a venture they could not
control and the outcome was once again one of unanticipated consequences.
Of course, political undercurrents in an organization are not easy to pick
out at times In particular, hidden agendas are intendedly secret. This fact,
though, reinforces the need for a clinical perspective. Gibson points out in
a study of a large-scale project in a bank that the analyst will generally be
given an overrationalized explanation of organizational practices and that the
researcher (implicitly, too, the practicioner) must consciously try to get be-
neath the surface. 28
Implementation as the Management of Change
The arguments made so far justify a particular focus on implementation.
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Obviously, however, a more detailed framework is needed to extend that focus
to provide specific techniques for managing implementation. Perhaps, given
the exploratory nature of research to date, it is premature to suggest any
particular framework. None the less, from recent studies and from the less
formalized perceptions of a number of experienced implementers , it does seem
that viewing the implementation process in terms of a social change process
provides a paradigm that is both conceptually rich and practical in its im-
plications. That paradigm is especially consistent with the main theme of
this paper in that it centers on the role of the change agent - the implementer
- as a clinician, a 'process consultant' (in Schein's phrase) 29 and a facili-
tator.
We often fairly glibly talk about implementation as an organizational
change process and the management scientist as a change agent, without paus-
ing to examine the implications of interpreting that literally. There has
been an immense variety of work throughout the social sciences on the dynamics
of planned change and this work shows a remarkable unity, whether its speci-
fic topic is the training of Benedictine novices (Erlksen)30, brainwashing of
POW's in Korea (Schein) , organization change (Bennis)^^^ or group dynamics
(Cartwright)33. On the whole, planned change has ignored the technical and
technological aspects of social change, but its Insights still hold extremely
well in the technical world of OR and MIS.
The most basic framework is Lewin's (expanded by Schein) which views
change as a three-stage process:
Figure 4
The Lewin-Schein Model of Chnage
Unfreezing
i
Changing
i
Refreezing
Each of these stages must be vjorked through if a change program 16 to be
effective. Schein defines the stages:
"1. Unfreezing : an alteration of the forces acting on the individual
such that his stable equilibrium is disturbed sufficiently to
motivate him and make him ready to change; this can be accomplished
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either by increasing the pressure to change or by reducing
some of the threats or resistances to change....
2. Changing ; the presentation of a direction of change and
the actual process of learning new attitudes
3. Refreezing ; the integration of the changed attitudes into
the rest of the personality and/or into ongoing significant
emotional relationships. "3'4
Schein's description maps well onto OR/MS implementation ('implementation'
here includes all three stages of course; the technical tradition that the
"Through a Glass Darkly" panel complained of views the middle stage, 'Changing'
or 'Action', as equivalent to implementation and the responsibility for the
preceding and succeeding processes as being the organization's not the designer's)
The Unfreezing stage perhaps explains much of our conventional wisdom. "Top
management support", "a felt need by the client" and "an immediate, visible
problem to work on" (See Table 3 ) , factors that facilitate implementation,
all relate to the need that there be motivation and momentum for change. Alter
reports, in a detailed study of 56 computer systems and models, that systems
that were 'sold' to the user by the technical group were rarely . successful. -^5
Change needs to be self-motivated and the client-system must take responsibil-
ity for and be committed to the change program (for a detailed discussion of
this aspect of Unfreezing see Bennis^^). "Resistance to change" reflects a
lack of Unfreezing; such resistance is often assumed by the analyst who en-
counters it to be a pathological rejection of Truth, Beauty, and Integer Pro-
gramming. The Lewin-Schein model highlights the fact that this resistance
may be a reasonable response from a system in equilibrium that feels no moti-
vation to adjust. The currency of management science is Change and analytic
specialists often work from the viewpoint that change is generally desirable
in itself. Since, however, change programs are almost certain to be ineffect-
ual unless the Unfreezing stage has been worked through, the management scien-
tist must take on as part of his function the creation of a climate for change.
Sometimes this climate builds itself - an urgent problem involving substantial
costs or profits can unfreeze a manager very quickly.
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An unfrozen system will be homeostatic, trying to dampen change; once
unfrozen, however, that system must change, must find a new equilibrium. By
working to unfreeze an organization, the implementer can coopt its energy
and momentum. In marketing terms, one cannot sell change but must make the
consumer want to buyj the selling effort
must focus on building a 'felt need' for which w.e happen to have the solution;
the product itself should not even be mentioned until the consumer is Unfrozen.
The Refreezing stage explains many semi-successes in management science
applications, projects which have an apparently successful outcome but which
lose impetus and sink into oblivion when their sponsor or designer leaves the
scene. The system in that situation is not self-sustaining but maintained by
the enthusiasm and effort of a single individual. Change must be institution-
alized by the building of a new and stable equilibrium that supports the change.
Again, there are clear implications for the management scientist in building
systems that are intended for more than one-shot use; he must make sure that
the change is truly 'complete', that the system is embedded in the organization.
This may require training, the assignment of a systems 'manager' within the
user department or even new operating procedures. In particular, the change
is not complete if the system is not consonant with the organization's control
and reward systems. Alter reports that many of the systems he examined had
difficulties obtaining the necessary input data if that data was not processed
routinely by the department responsible.-^
The dynamics of the Lewin-Schein model are complex and only casual il-
lustrations have been given here. Sorensen and Zand used the model in a study
of 280 management science projects. ^8 Their results suggest that the frame-
work has substantial explanatory power and that the Refreezing stage seems
most critical in explaining implementation success.
A Strategy for Managing Change
Regardless of its value as a basic paradigm, however, the raw Lewin-Schein
model lacks detail. Kolb and Frohman's model of the consulting process in
oreanizational development extends the frame to provide a rich normative base39
(Organizational Development is to Planned Change what Management Science is to
Operations Research) . Urban used the
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Kolb-Frohman model in his own implementation of marketing models; his paper
"Building Models for Managers" (Interfaces 1974)^'^ discusses it in substantial
detail, relating it directly to the technical minutiae of a modelling project.
Like Lewin and Schein, Kolb and Frohman argue that effective organization-
al change involves working through a series of stages. The seven stages they
define are presented in terms of the consultant's actions. Figure 5 shows
the Kolb-Frohman model and Urban 's reformulation of it in the context of
implementing data-based marketing models.
[Figure 5]
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'Action' of course is not implementation, anymore than getting a model
up-and-running guarantees its use. The central Action stage must be preceded
by the establishment of a contract for the venture (this is an elaboration
of Unfreezing) and followed by Evaluation and Termination, where the system
is linked into the ongoing organizational activities.
SCOUTING is the stage least directly relevant to implementation (though
certainly relevant to consulting in the management science area) . It involves
matching the capabilities of the consultant with the needs of the client-
organization; this implies avoiding what Heany has called "Have technique,
will travel", in which every problem is solved by, say, linear programming.
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ENTRY Involves ensuring legitimacy for action: defining the problem-situation,
the nature of a solution, criteria for evaluation and the allocation of
responsibilities and resources, even if only at a general level. In arguing
earlier that the management scientist should define his role as being essen-
tially clinical and facilitative, many points were made that can be more ex-
plicitly captured in terms of this Entry stage. Entry requires subtle skills
and in many instances far more time and effort than any other aspect of im-
plementation (see Urban 's case study: A Family Planning System which elabor-
ates on the relative effort involved in Entry'^^) . Far too often the analyst
responds to the pressure for visible results and gets going on formalizing
the model or system, leaving the 'people' issues to be sorted out later. How-
ever, most of the critical decisions are made at Entry, particularly in com-
plex projects which involve an innovative system with many inputs, users and
applications. Moreover, it is in Entry that the client's expectations are
set; to some extent implementation i£ the management of expectations - many
failures occur not because a 'good' model was not delivered, but because the
'right' one was not or because the user had excessively high expectations which
led him to enthusiastically support the effort but which could never be met
in practice.
Lucas provides an insightful case study of how the Entry stage should be
managed. He describes a technically simple MIS built for the United Farm
Workers Union (the simplicity of the system meant of course that Action was
brief and easily handled)^^. Lucas and his co-workers diagnosed the state of
the client-system and found that the long-service older professional core of
the UFW would need careful Unfreezing, that while they might not actively re-
sist the change in operations and style implicit in the system, they were
clearly not motivated to accept it. The MIS team arranged a retreat at which
they presented a simple design plan with the statement that they would feel
unhappy if at least half the plan were not rejected and redefined by the UFW
personnel. In this way, the criticisms, restatements and definitions provided
by the UFW group shifted the change program from being externally brought in,
towards being self-motivated and under their control and initiation. As a
tactic for unfreezing this approach seems generally valuable. Urban similarly
designed a simple 'Mod 1' model for a family planning agency. ^-^ This model
was overgeneral and incomplete; by getting the user group to determine whether
the errors in output were due to faults in the model or to some aspect of the
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wider environment that the user group had not identified. Urban threw the
responsibility for developing a better model onto the users, connnitting and
involving them.
Vertinsky, Barth et al^^ at the University of British Columbia have been
directly involved in a number of implementations, working explicitly from this
approach. They similarly stress the critical importance of Entry and Unfreez-
ing. From these and similar studies it seems possible to specify the issues
in Entry - and implicitly the responsibilities of the implementer: successful
resolution of Entry requires:
1) a felt need : a. the implementer must make sure that the problem
to be worked on is visible and seen as relevant
b. he must make sure that the 'client' has a motive
and commitment for action
2) a definition of goals in operational terms
a. what are the criteria for 'success'?
b. what are the priorities and tradeoffs?
c. what 'key' indicators' can be used to measure
progress and accomplishment?
3) a contract for change ; a 'deal' between designer and client in which
the following is established
a. 'trust' - personal, professional or political
b. mutual understanding (cf. Churchman and Scheinblatt)
c. mutual respect for each other's style, investment
and needs
d. realistic, mutual expectations
4) diagnosis and resolution of resistance to change by :
a. including users as well as the client in implementation
(Alloway makes the point that the designer often ig-
nores the secondary users, groups who are indirectly
but substantially affected by the system, by for ex-
ample, being responsible for collecting particular
input data) ^^
b. recognizing that resistance is a signal to be responded
to, not a pathology to be eliminated by fiat, power
or endplays
5) initial allocation of resources and responsibilities
a. meaningful user involvement
b
.
the development of a team
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This list is arid shorthand for a complex process (see Ginzberg [1975]
and Urban for further discussions of Entry). It is worth mentioning in
passing, that the characteristics and behavior necessary in the implementer
for the Entry process to be successful correspond closely to Schein's defin-
ition of a 'process consultant' who must know "how to diagnose and establish
helping relationships,'"^' who is an expert at getting a 'feel' for a situation,
at the same time being able to get people working together and goals and pro-
cedures operationalized.
Entry also provides the bases for EVALUATION. In many projects no real
definition of, or criteria for evaluating, success is ever made. The venture
was justified on the basis of the standard polite fictions of saving $X on
clerical personnel and increasing work load by Y% . The real impetus for the
project may remain a hidden agenda: the pponsor's belief that the system will
lead to 'better' decision-making. After the event, when the development costs
and time are their customary large fraction over budget, it is too late to
open up the hidden agenda and argue that the system is a 'success'. Evaluation
of a completed project can really be made meaningful only by formalizing,
before the system is even designed, a 'deal' or 'contract' which includes some
definition for success; this would require specifying 'key indicators', vari-
ables that the consultant and client group agree can be used as surrogate
measures for 'better decision-making'.^* Evaluation cannot be a post facto
audit . In an ongoing study, Ginzberg has identified a number of cases where
even after the event, the designer and user had very different perceptions
of the intent of the system and the degree to which it was successful'^9 j
'success' is again contingent on intent and the responsibility of the manage-
ment scientist is to ensure that there is a joint resolution of that contingency.
Radnor, Tansik and Rubens tein, whose approach to implementation is much more
analytic and technical than the one proposed here, argue in a similar
direction^O. j-^ey point to the relative difficulty of measuring the results
of OR/MS activities and strongly suggest that the predesign stage (approxi-
mating Entry) is where the PEC, Project Evaluation Criteria, must be established.
Only then can non-operational goals be formalized and any incongruence between
the client and designer, in terms of goals and expectations, be resolved.
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Determining the Criteria for 'Success'
A central issue in implementation research, hinted at earlier but not dis-
cussed directly, focuses on the question of what is^ success; Dickson and
Powers use four measures, which have very low intercorrelations and their ex-
perience seems fairly typical-* •'-• There is a tendency to equate success with
use, partly since terminal hours per month is an easily obtained metric.
However, there are some instances where a successful implementation is one
where the analyst helps a manager to understand his problem-environment
better, to a degree that he may then say 'that's a lousy model' even if the
model was built to his specifications. Management scientists too often think
of a model or system as a product; 'success' then means providing the best
product, sports coupe with all options , even where the
manager really wants cheap, quickly-provided transportation. Of all the
characteristics that seems to differentiate effective Implementers from the
OR graduates lambasted in the panel discussion quoted earlier, the distinction
CO
between a Service and a Product orientation seems most central. Again,
this conclusion needs to be modified in terms of diagnosis; there are occasions
as in the hypothetical instance of a one-shot planning model discussed earlier
(see Figure 2) where Entry is simple, the criteria for success easily identi-
fied and a Product definitely required. However, in the example following
that one, where the user is assumed to be hostile to the analytic approach,
a Product role on the part of the analyst virtually guarantees failure.
Huysmans provides a useful taxonomy of 'success '53; he defines three
'levels of adoption': (a fourth level has been added by this author to include
the innovative interactive Decision Support Systems described by Scott Morton
and Gerrlty)54;
1. does the model or system lead to management action (is it used?)
2. does it lead to management change (do management get new insights
or Information or adjust their decision process?)
3. does It lead to recurring use of the OR/MS approach ?
4. does it lead to an extension or redefinition of the task it supports ?
Only levels 1 and 2 can be evaluated in terms of the use of the system. Success
is contingent and the technical features of the system will be very different
depending on which level is assumed; that choice must be made before the sys-
tem is designed. The analyst's own view of his role Influences his ability
to select a level that is congruent with the clients 'needs', the organization's
current activities and capabilities, etc., etc - once again, the analyst him-
self must identify the et ceteras for this particular situation.
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Underlying the recommendations made so far in this paper is a more
fundamental Issue. Every management scientist has an implicit model of the
decision process that he uses; generally that model comes from the Rational-
istic tradition that underpins the analytic disciplines. That tradition is
normative, stressing logic and method. It is also axiomatic and most analysts
ignore that fact. The axioms of one discipline may be the hypotheses of
another; for example, the concept of utility, which is axiomatic to economics
and decision theory, is a major hypothesis - not too well supported experi-
mentally - in cognitive psychology. The point is critical; managementsdent-
ists have too often seen the analytic approach as the one Right Way and ele-
vate the formalization and structuring of problems above the implementation
of effective solutions as against 'correct' or 'optimal' ones. They tend
to disdain the way in which managers operate and to lack even an understand-
ing of what that way is. Few management scientists are at all familiar with
descriptive theories of the decision process. For example, Lindblom's model
of 'Muddling Through' in political science shows that in many
instances margin-dependent choices rather than formal evaluation of outcomes
can be a highly effective way of dealing with complex problems. 55 Lindblomian
decision-makers examine only the alternatives that are close to their exper-
ience; they cannot assess the utility of pomegranates and oranges but can de-
cide if they prefer three apples to the two oranges they have now. Management
scientists operate from their implicit model of decision-making; it Is a
powerful one but it does not reflect the actual behavior of many of their
clients who are often very effective decision-makers
,
particularly in their
ability to deal with problems they do not consciously understand. The clini-
cal facilitator, even when he aims at moving a manager towards the Rational
ideal, will recognize where the manager starts from, understand the dynamics
of his response and respect his abilities. Implementation must start from
this understanding and the implementer must include in his body of knowledge
descriptive as well as normative theories of the decision process. Minzberg,
for example, shows that the manager lives in and prefers a world of 'Brevity,
Fragmentation and Variety '56. Knowledge of this aspect of the management
reality in itself enables the analyst to match his techniques to the context.
Schein speaks of management as a process of influence-*'; his definition applies
directly to implementation.

on: The Role of the Implementer
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A role is mainly a set of expectations about how to behave. In general
the expectations of the graduating OR or MIS specialist have been that his
role is that of a technician and that any difficulties he encounters in
getting managers to make use of the tools he provides comes from their in-
adequacies, not his. What has been presented in this paper is an outline
for a more effective role. It really requires little new knowledge, only small
adjustments of attitude which lead to large changes in outcome. The role
of 'facilitator' and manager of change is in some ways an easier one than
that of the much-beleagured, ever-struggling Expert in an alien land. This
is not to argue against technical ability; indeed, the argument here takes
technical skill as a given. However, techniques are means not ends and must
be matched to context.
It is convenient, though an arbitrary dichotomy, in concluding this
argument, to draw a distinction between Technician and Implementer.
Locus of effort
Output
Attitude towards
Change Process
Main skill areas
Assumptions about the
decision process
Slogan
TECHNICIAN
DESIGN
Product
DIFFUSION OF
INNOVATION
KNOWLEDGE
TECHNIQUES
ANALYTIC
PRESCRIPTIVE
"HAVE TECHNIQUE. WILL
TRAVEL"
IMPLEMENTER
ENTRY/EVALUATION/
TERMINATION
SERVICE
PROCESS CONSULTANT
CHANGE AGENT
DIAGNOSIS FACILITATION
AND TECHNIQUES
DESCRIPTIVE
"IT ALL DEPENDS ..."
The list above is largely self-explanatory. The technician's role is seen
as one of isolation, strongly centered around expertise. His view of change as
being a process of 'diffusion of innovation' is that of NASA; potential users
are kept informed of new developments and techniques and it is assumed that
they will recognize their value and adopt them. This is the approach that led
from spaceship nosecones to Teflon frying pans but it does not get refriger-
ators into the hands of the eskimos who need them.
Implementation will never be easy. A complex model or system is an in-
vention. It has never existed before and we have very few guidelines for
building it. Now that the 'easy' triumphs have been accomplished - the auto-
mation of all the payrolls and accounts receivable in the world - future
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innovations will almost certainly involve qualitative improvements in
decision-making - better ways of doing the same jobs, and new jobs, too. In
that situation, implementation will always involve a range of users over a
long time-frame, will have many political and organizational impacts and re-
quire far more than technical skills in the analyst. This paper began by
quoting pessimistic figures and pessimistic managers. There really is no need
for pessimism. We have substantial insight into managing change in organi-
zations, the technology of models and computer systems no longer seems to be
the critical limiting factor and we have a new generation of specialists enter-
ing the Real World who understand the technology but are concerned with its
wider applications. The key point in the argument here is to suggest that
the major constraint on implementation is the analyst's view of his role. If
he can recognize that implementation is not the same as design and that he
has a responsibility to create the climate for change and to institutionalize
the change he introduces , then he can be immensely effective with little ad-
justment other than patience, humility, and common sense (these are admittedly
virtues the average manager does not associate with his OR whizkids). The
leverage in implementation is the implementer himself and his control and in-
fluence are basically determined by his own assessment of the role he should
play.
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